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Abstract
We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior
in games. Instead of using lexicographic beliefs to capture infinitely less likely conjec-
tures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide among strategies
that are outcome-equivalent given their conjectures. A player is event-rational if she
best responds to a conjecture and uses a list of subsets of the other players’ strategies
to break ties among outcome-equivalent strategies. Using type spaces to capture inter-
active beliefs, we show that event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality
(RCBER) imply S∞W , the set of admissible strategies that survive iterated elimination
of dominated strategies. By strengthening standard belief to validated belief, we show
that event-rationality and common validated belief of event-rationality (RCvBER) im-
ply IA, the iterated admissible strategies. We show that in complete, continuous and
compact type structures, RCBER and RCvBER are nonempty, hence providing epis-
temic criteria for S∞W and IA.
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mon Knowledge; Rationality; Completeness.
∗We are grateful to seminar participants at Collegio Carlo Alberto, Rochester, Southampton, Stony
Brook, Cyprus, the Fall 2009 Midwest International Economics and Economic Theory Meetings, the 2010
Royal Economic Society Conference, the 10th SAET Conference, the 2010 Workshop on Epistemic Game
Theory, Stony Brook, the CRETE 2010 in Tinos and the Second Brazilian Workshop of the Game Theory
Society. We thank an anonymous referee and especially the editor in charge, for their careful and insightful
suggestions.
†Department of Economics, University of Rochester.
‡Economics Division, University of Southampton.
1
1 Introduction
As noted by Samuelson (1992) and many others, there is a potential problem in dealing with
common knowledge of admissibility in games, which is known as the inclusion-exclusion
problem. The reason is that, under the assumptions of probabilistic beliefs and expected
utility, a strategy is admissible if and only if it is a best response to a belief with full support.
So a natural way of obtaining the prediction of admissible choices is to require that players
consider all strategies of their opponents to be possible. But then the prediction of an
admissible choice for a player is accompanied by a belief that does not exclude any strategy
of the player’s opponents from consideration, in particular it does not exclude strategies that
are not admissible. So a player cannot be certain that the opponents do not play inadmissible
strategies.
Recently, Brandenburger et al. (2008), henceforth BFK, provided a way of dealing with
the inclusion-exclusion issue, by using lexicographic expected utility (LEU) and the notion of
assumption in the place of certainty. Roughly speaking, a player with a list of probabilistic
beliefs can have a fully supported overall belief while “assuming” certain events that are
not equal to the whole state space. BFK show that strategies that survive m+ 1 rounds of
iterated elimination of inadmissible strategies are the strategies compatible with Rationality
and mth-order Assumption of Rationality (RmAR), for every natural number m. However,
the limiting construction as m → ∞, RCAR, is empty in complete and continuous type
structures. Therefore, BFK do not provide an epistemic characterization of IA. Keisler and
Lee (2011) and Yang (2009) have recently extended BFK’s analysis and obtained nonempti-
ness of RCAR. The former allows for discontinuous type mappings, and the latter uses a
weaker notion of assumption. Perea (2012) shows that common assumption of rationality is
always possible in finite structures.
We propose an alternative route. Instead of an LEU-based analysis, we use event-
rationality to allow for players to break ties with lists of subsets of opponents’ strategies.
That is, we use a different notion of rationality: the LEU-based approaches assume that play-
ers are lexicographic expected utility maximizers. We assume that players are event-rational.
The two notions of rationality are equally capable of reconciling “belief of rationality” with
“admissible choice”. The difference comes into play in the analysis of interactive beliefs. In-
teractive beliefs are described by type spaces. In our framework, a type of a player determines
her beliefs over the strategies and types of the other players (as in the standard framework)
and in addition it determines the tie-breaking list of events that the (event-rational) type
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uses. As a result, common belief of event-rationality bypasses the inclusion-exclusion issue.
In contrast, in an LEU-based analysis a type of a player determines her lexicographic beliefs
over the strategies and types of the other players, and the inclusion-exclusion tension is by-
passed by the use of “assumption” in the place of certainty. Under our approach, we provide
epistemic foundations for both the solution concept proposed by Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)
(S∞W ) and iterated admissibility (IA).
We consider finite two-player games in strategic form. The two players are Ann and
Bob, denoted by superscripts “a” and “b”. In order to provide some intuition about event-
rationality, note that if a strategy sa of Ann’s is (expected utility) rational then it is a best
response to some probabilistic belief, v ∈ ∆(Sb), where Sb is the set of Bob’s strategies.
If sa is inadmissible and therefore weakly dominated by some (mixed) strategy σa, then sa
and σa give the same payoff for all strategies of Bob in the support of v while σa is strictly
better than sa for all probability measures with support equal to the complement of the
support of v. Hence, when Ann chooses an admissible strategy, it is as if Ann optimizes
given the belief v, as usual, but when she is completely indifferent between two strategies,
she compares their expected utilities with respect to a probability measure with support
equal to the complement of the support of v. We say that Ann “breaks ties” using the event
that is the complement of the support of v.
Event-rationality does not require that Ann breaks ties only with respect to the com-
plement of the support of her belief. Ann can conceivably break ties using any other set,
as long as it is outside her current frame of mind, that is, disjoint from the support of v.1
Furthermore, Ann need not use a single such tie-breaking set. She may well have many
such sets, each providing extra validation for the chosen strategy. We refer to a collection of
tie-breaking sets as a tie-breaking list.
The principle behind event-rationality is, therefore, the following: if two strategies are
outcome-equivalent given Ann’s belief, then Ann has no way of deciding among them within
her frame of mind: the two strategies yield the same outcome for whichever strategy of Bob
she considers possible. Ann must, therefore, resort to information beyond her frame of mind
to make a decision. For instance, she could resort to fully external means, like coin flips.
However, Ann would be neglecting information about the two strategies under consideration,
1But note that, for the purpose of breaking ties, it suffices to consider only subsets of Bob’s strategies.
In particular, when we introduce the formal model of interactive beliefs, it is without loss of generality to
assume that Ann uses only lists of Bob’s strategies to break ties, because lists that include the types of Bob
only matter for breaking ties through the strategies of Bob that they are related to.
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namely how they fare against strategies of Bob that are considered impossible by her belief.
Event-rationality postulates that Ann does not neglect this information and, at the same
time, she does not change what she thinks about Bob’s choices.
Turn now to interactive beliefs, captured by type structures. Let T a and T b be the sets
of types of Ann and Bob. A type ta ∈ T a determines Ann’s conjectures over Bob’s choices,
Ann’s beliefs over Bob’s types and so on, together with the tie-breaking list. A state for Ann
is a strategy-type pair (sa, ta) and the beliefs over Bob are given by probability measures over
Sb × T b. A strategy-type pair (sa, ta) of Ann’s is called event-rational if sa is optimal given
ta’s belief over Sb and breaks ties for all sets in ta’s tie-breaking list. States where event-
rationality and common belief of event-rationality obtain are captured as the intersection
of infinitely many events: Ann is event-rational, and so is Bob; Ann is certain that Bob is
event-rational and Bob is certain that Ann is event-rational. And so on. This yields our
RCBER ((Event) Rationality and Common Belief of Event-Rationality) set of states.
Event-rationality captures the idea of choosing a strategy with extra validation, in the
sense that a strategy has to be optimal under one’s belief and in addition it has to pass a
series of validating tie-breaking tests. We also introduce the idea of extra validation of a
belief. Consider a type ta that believes that an event E ∈ Sb × T b is true, and is associated
with a list ` of subsets of Sb. The belief on the event E will be validated by the list ` if there
is an element of the list, say Eb ∈ `, that is equal to the projection of E on Sb.
States where event-rationality and common validated belief of event-rationality obtain
are again captured as the intersection of infinitely many events: Ann and Bob are event-
rational. Ann has a validated belief that Bob is event-rational and Bob has a validated belief
that Ann is event-rational. And so on. This yields our RCvBER ((Event) Rationality and
Common validated Belief of Event-Rationality) set of states.
Our results are as follows. We show that in a complete structure, RCBER produces the
set of strategies that survive one round of elimination of inadmissible strategies followed by
iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (S∞W ), whereas RCvBER produces the
set of iterated admissible strategies (IA). We then show that strategies played under RCvBER
constitute a self-admissible set (SAS), but the converse is not necessarily true. Because BFK
have shown that every SAS is the implication of RCAR in some type structure, the RCvBER
construction is more restrictive than the RCAR construction of BFK. Nevertheless, we show
that the RCBER and the RCvBER are nonempty whenever the type structure is complete,
continuous and compact, therefore providing epistemic criteria for S∞W and IA.
Our approach provides an alternative and effective perspective to deal with common
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“knowledge” of admissibility in games. A solution to the inclusion-exclusion problem is
obtained by using event-rationality together with having Sb (from Ann’s perspective) as
one of the tie-breaking sets. LEU-based approaches also obtain a solution to the inclusion-
exclusion problem. But some conclusions coming from the LEU-based approach are functions
of the notions of rationality and beliefs adopted by the approach. For instance, from BFK
and Keisler and Lee (2011) we get that either continuity or completeness have to be dropped
for an epistemic characterization of IA to be obtained. Our results show that, using a
different notion of rationality, neither continuity nor completeness have to be dropped for
such a characterization to be obtained. We should also note that completeness captures the
idea that players have no prior knowledge about each other, so it is a desirable property in
an epistemic analysis. Robustness with respect to continuity of the type structure is another
desirable property, which is satisfied by our construction.
1.1 Related Literature
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) argue that common knowledge of rationality implies (in
terms of behavior) the iteratively undominated (IU) set, that is, the set of strategy pro-
files surviving iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies. Tan and Werlang (1988)
provide epistemic conditions for IU by characterizing RCBR (rationality and common be-
lief of rationality). Admissibility, or the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies, has a
long history in decision and game theory (see Wald (1939), Luce and Raiffa (1957) and
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)). However, Samuelson (1992) shows that common knowledge
of admissibility is not equivalent to iterated admissibility and does not always exist. Founda-
tions for the S∞W strategies (Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)) are provided by Bo¨rgers (1994)
(using approximate common knowledge), Brandenburger (1992) (using LEU (Blume et al.
(1991)) and 0-level belief) and Ben-Porath (1997) (in extensive form games). Stahl (1995)
defines the notion of lexicographic rationalizability and shows that it is equivalent to iterated
admissibility.
BFK use LEU and characterize rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR)
by the solution concept of self-admissible sets. They show that rationality and mth order
assumption of rationality is characterized by the strategies that survive m + 1 rounds of
elimination of inadmissible strategies, in complete type structures.2 Finally, RCAR is empty
in a complete and continuous lexicographic type structure when the agent is not completely
2See Section 5.1 for the formal definition of “assumption”.
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indifferent. Hence, although the IA set can be captured by RmAR (rationality and mth
order assumption of rationality) for big enough m (note that games are finite), BFK do not
provide an epistemic criterion for IA. Keisler and Lee (2011) show that RCAR is nonempty if
one drops continuity. Yang (2009) provides an epistemic criterion for IA, with an analogous
version of BFK’s RCAR, that makes use of a weaker notion of “assumption”. The message
from Keisler and Lee (2011) and Yang (2009) is that continuity strengthens the notion of
caution implied by fully supported LPS.3 The notion of caution implied by event-rationality
is independent of continuity.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we illustrate the differences
between the various notions of rationality and belief through examples. In Sections 3 and
4 we set up the framework and provide the relevant definitions, including event-rationality,
RCBER and RCvBER. In Section 5 we show that RmBER (m rounds of mutual belief)
generates S∞W and that RmvBER (m rounds of mutual validated belief) generates the IA
set, for big enough m. Moreover, we show that RmvBER is more restrictive than RCAR of
BFK. In Section 6 we show that RCBER and RCvBER are always nonempty in compact,
complete and continuous type structures, therefore providing epistemic criteria for S∞W and
IA. Finally, the Appendices A-C provide decision theoretic foundations for event-rationality
and validated beliefs, and characterize RCBER and RCvBER in type structures that are not
necessarily complete but satisfy a richness condition.
2 Examples
In order to illustrate the differences between the BFK approach and that of the present
paper, consider the following game from Samuelson (1992) and BFK. There are two players,
Ann and Bob.
1 [1]
L R
1 U 1, 1 0, 1
[1] D 0, 2 1, 0
From the literature we know that, under expected utility, rationality and common belief
of rationality (RCBR) is characterized by the best response sets (BRS) and, in a complete
3Perea (2012) shows that common assumption of rationality is always possible in finite structures.
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structure, the strategies that survive iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies.4 Can
we get a similar result for the admissible strategies and the iteratively admissible strategies
if we modify the notions of belief and of rationality? Recall that a strategy is admissible
if and only if it is a best response to a probability measure with full support (no strategy
of the other player is excluded). Then, the obvious solution is to specify that rationality
incorporates full support beliefs.
But such a specification does not always work. In the game above, if Ann is rational, she
assigns positive probability to Bob playing L and R. If Bob is rational, he assigns positive
probability to Ann playing U and D. Hence, Bob plays L. If Ann knows that Bob is rational,
she assigns positive probability only on Bob playing L. But then, Ann is not rational! In
other words, the RCBR set is empty for this game.
One solution is obtained using LEU. Suppose Ann’s primary belief assigns probability 1
to Bob playing L, and her secondary belief assigns probability 1 to Bob playing R. Bob’s
primary belief assigns 1 to Ann playing U and his secondary belief assigns 1 to Ann playing
D. Then, Bob playing L is (lexicographic expected utility) rational because he is indifferent
between L and R given his primary belief, but strictly prefers L given his secondary belief.5
Ann playing U is rational because U is the best response given her primary belief. She
assumes that Bob is rational, because she considers Bob playing L infinitely more likely than
Bob playing R.6 Similarly, Bob assumes that Ann is rational. As a result, rationality and
common assumption of rationality (RCAR) is nonempty.
A similar result can be obtained if we use the definition of event-rationality in the context
of type structures augmented with tie-breaking lists. Suppose Ann’s belief assigns probability
1 to Bob playing L and Bob’s belief µ assigns probability 1 to Ann playing U. Moreover,
Bob has the set Sa \ supp µ in his tie-breaking list. Bob playing L is event-rational because
he plays best response given his beliefs and, although L and R are outcome-equivalent at
supp µ, L is better under at least one probability measure with support equal to Sa \supp µ.
Similarly, Ann is event-rational since, under her belief, she does not need to break ties.
Finally, Ann believes that Bob is event-rational and Bob believes that Ann is event-rational.
Hence, rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER) is nonempty.
In the game above RCAR and RCBER produce the same strategies because the IA and
the S∞W sets are equal. However, this is not always true. Consider the following game
4Qa ×Qb is a BRS if each sa ∈ Qa is strongly undominated with respect to Sa ×Qb and likewise for b.
5That is, the associated sequence of payoffs under L is lexicographically greater than the sequence under
R.
6For more information on the notions of “assumption” and “infinitely more likely”, see BFK.
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which illustrates the difference between RCBER (which yields the S∞W set) and RCvBER
(which yields the IA set):
L R
U 1, 0 1, 3
M 0, 2 2, 2
D 0, 4 1, 1
Because D is strongly dominated and Ann is event-rational, she will not play D. In a
complete structure though, event-rational Ann will play U or M, while event-rational Bob
will play L or R. For example, Ann’s type playing U is event-rational if she assigns probability
1 to Bob playing L. Ann’s type playing M is also event-rational if she assigns probability 1 to
Bob playing R. Note that Ann never needs to break ties. Moreover, for both U and M there
are event-rational types of Ann’s who assign positive probability to event-rational types of
Bob playing L or R. And similarly for Bob. In other words, these types of Ann believe the
event “Bob is event-rational”, Bob’s types believe the event “Ann is event-rational”, and
so on for every finite order of beliefs about beliefs. Hence, RCBER yields the S∞W set,
{U,M} × {L,R}.
Now repeat the same procedure but impose a stronger form of belief. Take an event
E ⊆ Sb×T b, where Sb and T b are the set of Bob’s strategies and types, respectively. A type
ta of Ann is associated with a belief over Sb × T b and a list ` of subsets of Sb. We say that
ta has a validated belief in an event E if it assigns probability 1 to E and there exists an
element Eb of the list ` that is equal to the projection of E on Sb. Imposing event-rationality
and common validated belief of event-rationality gives us RCvBER.
Which strategies are generated by RCvBER? The first round of RCvBER yields the set
of event-rational types for Ann and event-rational types for Bob, just like RCBER. But the
second round of RCvBER requires that each of Ann’s types has a validated belief in the event
“Bob is rational”, and similarly for Bob. Then, all types playing L are excluded. To see
this, note that if Bob is event-rational and has a validated belief in the event “Ann is event-
rational”, then the strategies played by event-rational types of Ann’s, namely {U,M}, must
belong to his list. The only event-rational types of Bob playing L (and having a validated
belief that Ann is event-rational) are the ones that assign probability 1 on Ann playing M. In
order to have a validated belief in {U,M}×T a0 , where T a0 is Ann’s event-rational types, Bob
must have U as a tie-breaking set in his list. Moreover, he assigns probability 1 to M and
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therefore has to break ties, because L and R are outcome equivalent given M. But L is never
a best response for any conjecture with support on U. Hence, Bob, assigning probability one
to M, cannot have a validated belief that Ann is event-rational.
In the third round of RCvBER, Ann has a validated belief that Bob has a validated belief
that Ann is event-rational. This means that Ann’s types playing U are excluded, because
those types assign positive probability to Bob’s types playing L, and none of them has a
validated belief that Ann is event-rational. The only event-rational types of Ann playing M
and of Bob playing R survive all rounds of RCvBER and generate the IA set, {M} × {R}.
3 Setup
Let (Sa, Sb, pia, pib) be a two-player finite strategic form game, with pia : Sa × Sb → R,
and similarly for b (as usual, a stands for Ann, and b stands for Bob). In what follows
we sometimes present definitions and results focusing only on player a. In these cases,
the definitions and results for player b are analogous. For any given topological space
X, let ∆(X) denote the space of probability measures defined on the Borel subsets of X,
endowed with the weak* topology. We extend pia to ∆(Sa) × ∆(Sb) in the usual way:
pia(σa, σb) =
∑
(sa,sb)∈Sa×Sb σ
a(sa)σb(sb)pia(sa, sb). A (possibly mixed) strategy σa ∈ ∆(Sa)
is a best response to a conjecture v ∈ ∆(Sb) if pia(σa, v) ≥ pia(sˆa, v) for every sˆa ∈ Sa.7 It is
denoted by σa ∈ BRa(v).
3.1 Admissibility and Event-Rationality
The following definition and Lemma are taken from BFK.
Definition 1. Fix X×Y ⊆ Sa×Sb. A strategy sa ∈ X is weakly dominated with respect
to X × Y if there exists σa ∈ ∆(Sa), with σa(X) = 1, such that pia(σa, sb) ≥ pia(sa, sb) for
every sb ∈ Y and pia(σa, sb) > pia(sa, sb) for some sb ∈ Y . Otherwise, say sa is admissible
with respect to X × Y . If sa is admissible with respect to Sa × Sb, simply say that sa is
admissible.
Lemma 1. A strategy sa ∈ X is admissible with respect to X × Y if and only if there exists
σb ∈ ∆(Sb), with supp σb = Y , such that pia(sa, σb) ≥ pia(ra, σb) for every ra ∈ X.
7In what follows, we will use the term “conjecture” to refer to a probabilistic belief over the opponent’s
strategy choices.
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Lexicographic beliefs have been used in dealing with the inclusion-exclusion issue iden-
tified by Samuelson (1992) (see BFK, Brandenburger (1992), Stahl (1995), Keisler and Lee
(2011) and Yang (2009)). We follow an alternative approach, based on “tie-breaking lists.”
We stress that our approach is a way of capturing admissible behavior (Lemma 3 below)
and at the same time dealing with belief of rationality. Admissible behavior can be viewed
as the requirement that ties are broken by events outside the conjecture of a player. This
leads us to consider tie-breaking events, as follows.
Let ` = {F1, ..., Fk} be a list of subsets of Sb, with F1 ( F2 ( · · · ( Fk = Sb, for some
k ≥ 1. The collection of all such lists, Lb, is a set of finite cardinality, because Sb is a finite
set.
For a given conjecture v ∈ ∆(Sb), let σa ∼supp v sa denote that the mixed strategy
σa ∈ ∆(Sa) satisfies pia(σa, sb) = pia(sa, sb) for every sb ∈ supp v. Therefore, σa ∼supp v sa
denotes that σa is outcome equivalent to sa in supp v.
Definition 2. Given a pair (v, `) ∈ ∆(Sb) × Lb, we say that a strategy sa ∈ Sa is event-
preferred to a strategy ra ∈ Sa with respect to (v, `) if either
• pia(sa, v) ≥ pia(ra, v), and it is not the case that ra ∼supp v sa, or
• ra ∼supp v sa and for each F ∈ ` with F \ supp v 6= ∅, there exists v′ ∈ ∆(Sb) with
supp v′ = F \ supp v and pia(sa, v′) ≥ pia(ra, v′).
A pure strategy sa ∈ Sa being preferred to a mixed strategy σa ∈ ∆(Sa) is similarly
defined. A strategy is event-rational if it is maximal with respect to the event-preferred
preference relation.
Definition 3. Given a pair (v, `) ∈ ∆(Sb) × Lb, we say that a strategy sa ∈ Sa is event-
rational with respect to (v, `) if it is event-preferred with respect to (v, `) to every mixed
strategy σa ∈ ∆(Sa).
Since we introduce a new notion of being preferred to, it is important to verify the
following.
Lemma 2. For each pair (v, `) ∈ ∆(Sb) × Lb, there exists sa ∈ Sa which is event-rational
with respect to (v, `).
Proof. As Sa is finite, BRa(v) 6= ∅. We show that there exists sa ∈ BRa(v) that is not
weakly dominated given F \ supp v 6= ∅ by any σa ∈ BRa(v), for all F ∈ `. Using Lemma 3
below, sa is then event-rational with respect to (v, `).
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Let Fl ∈ ` be the smallest set such that Fl \ supp v 6= ∅. If there does not exist such
a set then supp v = Sb and event-rationality is trivially satisfied. Suppose without loss
of generality that l = 1. Let Ha0 (v) = BR
a(v) and recall that BRa(v) includes all pure
and mixed strategies that are best responses to v. Let Ha1 (v) ⊆ Ha0 (v) be the set of pure
and mixed strategies that are weakly undominated by any σa ∈ Ha0 (v), given F1 \ supp v.
Because Sa is a finite set, Ha1 (v) 6= ∅. Moreover, it cannot be that Ha1 (v) contains only mixed
strategies, because if all strategies in the support of a mixed strategy are weakly dominated
given some set E, then the same is true for the mixed strategy. Let Ha2 (v) ⊆ Ha0 (v) be
the set of pure and mixed strategies that are weakly undominated by any σa ∈ Ha0 (v),
given F2 \ supp v. We claim that ∈ Ha1 (v) ∩ Ha2 (v) 6= ∅, and by the same argument as
above, Ha1 (v) ∩Ha2 (v) contains at least one pure strategy. In fact, pick σa1 ∈ Ha1 (v) \Ha2 (v),
so σa1 is weakly dominated by some σ
a
2 ∈ Ha2 (v) given F2 \ supp v. Because σa1 is weakly
undominated by σa2 given F1 \ supp v, and F1 \ supp v ⊆ F2 \ supp v, it must be that
σa1 ∼F1\supp v σa2 and therefore σa2 ∈ Ha1 (v). Therefore, σa2 ∈ Ha1 (v) ∩ Ha2 (v), as claimed.
Continuing, let Hal (v) ⊆ Ha0 (v) be the set of pure and mixed strategies that are weakly
undominated by any σa ∈ Ha0 (v), given Fl \ supp v, for l = 3, ..., k. By induction, say that⋂m
l=1H
a
l (v) 6= ∅ for m < k. Pick σam ∈
⋂m
l=1H
a
l (v) \ Ham+1(v), so σam is weakly dominated
by some σam+1 ∈ Ham+1(v) given Fm+1 \ supp v. Because σam is weakly undominated by
σam+1 given Fl \ supp v, l = 1, ...,m, and F1 \ supp v ⊆ · · ·Fm \ supp v ⊆ Fm+1 \ supp v, it
must be that σam ∼Fl\supp v σam+1 for l = 1, ...,m and therefore σam+1 ∈
⋂m
l=1 H
a
l (v). Hence⋂k
l=1H
a
l (v) 6= ∅, and the same argument above shows existence of a pure strategy in that
set. That is, there exists sa that is weakly undominated by any σa ∈ Ha0 (v) = BRa(v), given
Fl \ supp v, for l = 1, . . . , k.
The following Lemma shows the connection between admissibility and event-rationality.
Lemma 3. For each pair (v, `) ∈ ∆(Sb) × Lb and each F ∈ `, if sa is event-rational with
respect to (v, `) and supp v ⊆ F , then sa is admissible with respect to Sa×F . Conversely, if
sa is admissible with respect to Sa × F , for each F ∈ `, then, for each F ∈ ` there exists v
with supp v = F , such that sa is event-rational with respect to (v, `).
Proof. Suppose that sa is event-rational for v such that supp v ⊆ F . If supp v = F then
the result is immediate so suppose supp v ⊂ F and F \ supp v 6= ∅. Suppose there exists
σa ∈ ∆(Sa) with pi(σa, sb) ≥ pia(sa, sb) for every sb ∈ F , with strict inequality for some
sb ∈ F . Because sa ∈ BRa(v), we have sa ∼supp v σa, which implies that there exists v′ with
supp v′ = F \ supp v and pi(sa, v′) ≥ pi(σa, v′), a contradiction. Conversely, suppose sa is
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admissible with respect to Sa × F , for each F ∈ `. Pick a set F ∈ `. Since, sa is admissible
with respect to Sa × F , there exists v with supp v = F such that sa ∈ BR(v). For F ′ ∈ `
such that F ′ ( F we have F ′ \F = ∅ and the definition for event-rationality of sa is trivially
satisfied. For F ′ ∈ ` such that F ( F ′, take σa such that sa ∼F σa and suppose that there
does not exist v′ with supp v′ = F ′ \ F such that pi(sa, v′) ≥ pi(σa, v′). Then, σa weakly
dominates sa on F ′ \ F , and therefore also on F ′, a contradiction.
3.2 Interpretation of Event-Rationality
The idea of event-rationality is that Ann uses each of the sets in the list ` to break ties.
Whenever Ann has a conjecture v ∈ ∆(Sb) over Bob’s choices under which sa is optimal
and sa is outcome-equivalent to a (mixed) strategy σa given any sb in supp v, Ann uses
each F ∈ ` as a “tie-breaking experiment”, by checking whether there exists at least one
probability measure v′ with support on F \ supp v that validates the choice of sa. Ann is
fully confident in the conjecture v and in the best response sa to v, as long as there is no
σa that is outcome equivalent to sa in supp v. In that case, the probabilistic assessments
captured by v are irrelevant, because whichever other conjecture vˆ with supp vˆ = supp v
would not help Ann breaking ties between sa and σa. Ann then uses the tie-breaking list `
as we just described.
It is important to note that, although the “tie-breaking experiments” are additional
thought experiments that Ann uses to guide her choices, they do not play the role of ad-
ditional hypotheses, as one would have if we were in a LEU framework. If sa is indifferent
to σa according to v, but not outcome equivalent in supp v, then event-rationality does not
require that the tie-breaking list be invoked to decide between sa and σa.
3.2.1 Thought Experiments
As suggested above, the “tie-breaking experiments” are thought experiments used by the
decision maker to help making decisions. As with standard expected utility preferences,
when Ann is event-rational with respect to (v, `), she considers possible only the events that
are given positive probability by v. Intuitively speaking, the support of v is the largest
possible event that does not contain an impossible event. The events in the list ` are not
considered possible, but may nevertheless be relevant for Ann’s decisions.
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One way to understand the ideas involved here is as follows.8 Let a pair (v, `) be given,
and consider the events
L(v, `) = {F \ supp v : F ∈ `} \ {∅}.
By construction, (v, `) and (v, L(v, `)) represent the same event-rational preferences.9 One
can interpret event-rationality by viewing the elements of L(v, `) as the objects of the thought
experiments, and the probability measures µF on F ∈ L(v, `) that break ties in favor of some
candidate strategy sa as the outputs of the thought experiments. Thus, an event-rational
strategy with respect to (v, `) is one that is optimal under v and has successful outputs
against all thought experiments in the list L(v, `).
In particular, a probability measure µF on F ∈ L(v, `) is not actually a conjecture held
by Ann (it is just the output of some experiment), and the thought experiment is the act of
finding such probability measures on each F ∈ L(v, `) that break ties.
Using a thought experiment to break ties and yet considering the events in the experi-
ments impossible is simple to grasp when dealing with past events/actions: for instance, one
may wonder what would have happened if Germany had won World War II, and use it to
help deciding whether to move to Germany or not. But one knows that Germany did not
win. So the thought experiment “what if Germany had won” is simply a mental construct,
and the decision maker is sure that it is impossible. Still, this experiment may tip the scale
in favor of moving or not moving to Germany. When we deal with future rather than past
actions the same line of reasoning goes through, as illustrated in the following example.
Consider an upcoming football (soccer) match between the teams of coach Ann and coach
Bob. Their relevant strategies are the possible line-ups for their teams. Coach Bob has a
star defender who is disqualified from playing because of a red card in a previous match.
Coach Ann knows this and believes with probability one that the star defender will not play.
Moreover, coach Ann has two star strikers who, absent the star defender of coach Bob’s team,
are outcome equivalent given all the possible strategies (line-ups) that coach Ann believes
coach Bob can choose from. However, coach Ann chooses to put in the striker who would be
better if the star defender actually played. An impossible event in coach Ann’s mind helps
her break ties in favor of one of her strategies. Moreover, coach Ann can potentially think
of many other sets of “impossible” line-ups of coach Bob’s and evaluate how her outcome
8We thank the editor in charge for providing this interpretation.
9Observe that we necessarily have redundant preference representations. These redundancies lead to the
existence of redundant hierarchies of preferences if the standard universal construction, as in Appendix B,
is followed.
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equivalent strikers will perform. We require that these sets are nested, so that they always
contain a “core” object of a thought experiment, which in this example is the existence of
the star defender. Moreover, there is no presumption (as in the lexicographic approach) that
Ann is ranking these impossible scenarios in terms of how unlikely they are.
The following example, suggested by an anonymous referee, illustrates this point further:
L C R
U 4, 6 0, 0 4, 3
M 0, 0 4, 6 0, 3
D 2, 3 2, 3 0, 0
Suppose that Ann is event-rational with respect to (v, `), with v(L) = v(C) = 1/2 and
L(v, `) = {R}.10 The unique experiment considered is {R}, so the only possible outcome of
the experiment is the probability measure assigning probability 1 to R. Strategy D is outcome
equivalent to a coin-flip between U and M under supp v, so Ann cannot decide between D
and this coin-flip, and resorts to the experiment {R} for help. Under the unique outcome of
the experiment, D is strongly dominated by the coin-flip, so the coin-flip is event-preferred
to D with respect to (v, `). Note that R is weakly dominated by a coin-flip between L and
C. So Ann resorts to a thought experiment composed of an inadmissible strategy for Bob.
But, as we indicated above, her theory only considers possible that Bob plays either L or C,
which are admissible. So Ann believes that Bob plays admissibly.
3.2.2 Nested Thought Experiments
The lists used by an event-rational Ann are composed of strictly nested subsets of Sb, F1 (
F2 ( · · · ( Fk = Sb, for k ≥ 1. The requirement that Fk = Sb is needed to capture admissible
behavior (that is, admissibility with respect to Sa × Sb), as is clear from Lemma 3. The
nestedness requirement ensures existence of an event-rational choice for any pair (v, `), as
verified in Lemma 2. But beyond this agnostic justification for the requirement, it reveals
a particularity of event-rationality that is quite different from lexicographic models. In
these models, the hypotheses are disjoint events and lexicographic expected utility proceeds
sequentially, checking one hypothesis at a time, in lexicographic order. Here, the thought
experiments are not alternative hypotheses to be checked sequentially. There is no ranking
10To connect it with the previous example, one can think of R as Bob’s strategy of including his star
defender in the line-up.
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in terms of how unlikely each experiment is, and the experiments are to be performed all at
once.
The thought experiments can be viewed as having F1 as the anchor or target, that is,
the part of Sb that Ann targets for her experiment, and successive enlargements F2, ..., Fk,
with F1 ( F2 ( · · · ( Fk, as robustness checks all the way to the most imprecise superset
of G1, Fk = S
b. Dually, one can view the thought experiments as starting from the most
imprecise experiment Fk = S
b and moving down with successively more precise experiments
in a definite direction Fk ) Fk−1 ) · · · ) F1 towards the most precise experiment, the
target F1. Going back to the football example in Section 3.2.1, the target experiment for
coach Ann could be the presence of the star defender in coach Bob’s line up. We stress that
what we just described are two ways of interpreting the tie-breaking list, or how the decision
maker would design the experiments F1, ..., Fk. As all checks must be passed, they can be
performed in any order.
3.2.3 Decision Theoretic Considerations
Turn now to decision theoretic considerations. We postulate that a decision maker (Ann)
has a theory captured by her preference relation % and the resulting probability measure
µ. Let F0 = supp µ and write % as %0. Moreover, when faced with a comparison between
two acts that are completely indifferent according to her theory, Ann resorts to thought
experiments to break ties. This is captured by a list of conditional preferences, where the
conditioning events are outside F0. Formally, Ann’s choices are determined by a list of
preferences (%0,%1, . . . ,%k) and the resulting supports (F0, ..., Fk). F0 represents Ann’s
theory, while (F1, ..., Fk) with F1 ( F2 ( · · · ( Fk = Sb are thought experiments, used
only for the purposes of breaking complete indifference. Thus F0 describes Ann’s frame of
mind, as it contains the states that Ann considers possible, and (F1, ..., Fk) describe zero
probability “counter-factuals” as F0 ∩ Fi = ∅ for each i = 1, . . . , k. Ann prefers an act x to
an act y if x %0 y and if x is outcome-equivalent to y in F0, then x %i y for all i = 1, ..., k.
Appendix A provides a more detailed exposition and shows that the notion just defined is
equivalent to event-rationality.
3.3 Type Structures and Beliefs
Type structures are used to describe interactive beliefs. Because event-rationality has players
using tie-breaking sets, a type of a player must determine a conjecture and a list of tie-
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breaking sets. Observe that we assign a list of tie-breaking sets for each type, thereby fixing
that type’s thought experiments. An (event)-irrational type may not use the assigned tie-
breaking list, in the same way that an irrational type in the standard type space construction
may not choose based on expected utility maximization given his/her beliefs. Fix a two-
player finite strategic-form game 〈Sa, Sb, pia, pib〉.
Definition 4. An (Sa, Sb)-based type structure with tie-breaking lists is a structure
〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉,
where λa : T a → ∆(Sb × T b)× Lb, and similarly for b. Members of T a, T b are called types,
members of La, Lb are called lists and members of Sa × T a × Sb × T b are called states.
We refer to an (Sa, Sb)-based type structure with tie-breaking lists as simply a type
structure. The types spaces T a and T b are assumed topological. The sets Sa, Sb, La, Lb are
finite, and we endow each with the discrete topology so that they are compact spaces. The
belief mappings λa and λb are assumed Borel measurable. A type structure is: complete
when λa and λb are surjective (c.f. Brandenburger (2003)); continuous when λa and λb are
continuous; and compact when T a and T b are compact spaces.
The standard construction of all coherent hierarchies of “beliefs about beliefs” yields a
complete, continuous and compact type structure. So existence of such structures (which we
assume in some of our results below) is guaranteed. Some details are provided in Appendix
B.
We use the notation λa(ta) = (µa(ta), `a(ta)), with µa(ta) ∈ ∆(Sb × T b) and `a(ta) ∈ Lb.
Similarly for b. Fix an event E ⊆ Sb × T b and write
Ba(E) = {ta ∈ T a : µa(ta)(E) = 1}
as the set of types that are certain of the event E. This is the standard definition of
certainty (as 1-belief): the states of Bob are the strategy type pairs in Sb × T b, and Ann’s
beliefs are over Bob’s states. Note that Ba satisfies monotonicity: if Ann is certain of E and
E ⊂ F then Ann is also certain of F . Note also that, coupled with event-rationality, the
behavioral implications of 1-belief are different than under expected utility: the complement
of a probability 1 event may not be irrelevant for choices.
Fix E ⊆ Sb × T b and define the following operator
Ba∗(E) = {ta ∈ T a : projSbE ∈ `a(ta)},
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mapping an event E to the set of Ann’s types specifying a list that contains the projection
of E to the set of Bob’s strategies. We say that a type of Ann’s has a validated belief in
an event E ⊆ Sb × T b if the type belongs to the set
Bav (E) = B
a(E) ∩Ba∗(E).
In other words, Ann has a validated belief in E if she believes it and projSbE is one of the
objects of her thought experiments. Appendix A provides a preference based characterization
of validated beliefs.
3.3.1 Lists Made of Subsets of Strategies Suffice for Breaking Ties
Before proceeding further, let us stress the following important property. The principle
behind event-rationality is that a player goes beyond her “frame of mind” to break ties.
With a formal type structure, the frame of mind is given by a type ta and the associated
assessment µa(ta) over Sb × T b (note that the list `a(ta) captures what is beyond the frame
of mind). Hence, one could argue that we should consider lists over subsets of Sb × T b,
thereby treating strategies and types symmetrically. In fact, the inclusion/exclusion tension
identified by Samuelson (1992) could be interpreted as requiring that the player includes
“everything else” in her thought experiments.11
However, it is redundant to include lists of subsets of Sb × T b for tie-breaking purposes:
a list ` made of subsets Eb of Sb breaks ties between sa and σa if and only if a list ˆ` made of
subsets E of Sb × T b whose projections on Sb are given by the subsets Eb of the list ` also
breaks ties between sa and σa. This is obvious, as types are payoff irrelevant.
Moreover, if one insists in using lists ˆ` of subsets of Sb × T b, the analysis below would
follow on exactly the same lines, defining validated beliefs using the operator
Bˆa∗(E) = {ta ∈ T a : E ∈ ˆ`a(ta)}
in the place of the operator Ba∗ , where ˆ`
a(ta) would denote the list of subsets of Sb × T b
associated with type ta. In fact, as we just argued, tie-breaking purposes would not restrict
the “type” component of the lists ˆ`. In Appendix B.1, we show that nothing relevant would
be changed in the analysis below. Thus, the seemingly asymmetric treatment of strategies
and types is irrelevant, as a symmetric analysis can be provided with the appropriate changes
in notation.
11This logic is employed in BFK.
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3.4 RCBER - Rationality and Common Belief of Event-Rationality
With type structures, a state for Ann is a pair (sa, ta) determining what she plays (sa) and
her state of mind (ta). A strategy-type pair (sa, ta) ∈ Sa×T a is event-rational if sa is event-
rational with respect to λa(ta) = (margSbµ
a(ta), `a(ta)). We therefore have the following
definition.
Definition 5. Strategy-type pair (sa, ta) ∈ Sa × T a is event-rational if
• sa ∈ BRa(v), for v = margSbµa(ta),
• for each F ∈ `a(ta) with F \ supp v 6= ∅ and mixed strategy σa ∈ ∆(Sa) with σa ∼supp v
sa, there exists a v′ ∈ ∆(Sb) with supp v′ = F \supp v such that pia(sa, v′) ≥ pia(σa, v′).
Let Ra1 be the set of event-rational strategy-type pairs (s
a, ta). For finite m, define Ram
inductively by
Ram+1 = R
a
m ∩ [Sa ×Ba(Rbm)].
Similarly for b.
Definition 6. If (sa, ta, sb, tb) ∈ Ram+1 ×Rbm+1, say there is event-rationality and mth-order
belief of event-rationality (RmBER) at this state. If (sa, ta, sb, tb) ∈ ⋂∞m=1 Ram × ⋂∞m=1Rbm
say there is event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER) at this state.
In words, there is RCBER at a state if Ann is event-rational, Ann believes that Bob
is event-rational, Ann believes that Bob believes that Ann is event-rational, and so on.
Similarly for Bob. Believing that Bob is event-rational means that Ann is certain that
Bob only chooses strategies that are best responses to Bob’s conjectures that Ann considers
possible, and that Bob breaks ties using the sets of strategies in his list.
Note that for a strategy-type pair (sa, ta) to belong to Ram the following conditions are
satisfied. Strategy sa is a best response to v = margSbµ
a(ta), µa(ta)(Rbm−1) = 1 and whenever
σa ∼supp v sa, for each Eb ∈ `a(ta), there exists a probability measure v′ in Eb \ supp v for
which pia(sa, v′) ≥ pia(σa, v′). Notice that Ann is certain that the conjectures of Bob are of the
form v = margSaµ
b(tb), for tb ∈ projT bRbm−1, and knows that, for each such conjecture, Bob
breaks each tie using some v′ with support in Eb\supp v. We show below that this flexibility
implies that the set of strategies compatible with RCBER are the ones that survive one
round of elimination of inadmissible strategies, followed by iterated elimination of strongly
dominated strategies.
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3.5 RCvBER - Rationality and Common validated Belief of Event-
Rationality
Let R
a
1 be the set of event-rational strategy-type pairs (s
a, ta). For finite m, define R
a
m
inductively by
R
a
m+1 = R
a
m ∩ [Sa ×Bav (Rbm)].
Similarly for b.
The only difference with RCBER is that we use the validated belief operator instead of
the standard one.
Definition 7. If (sa, ta, sb, tb) ∈ Ram+1 ×Rbm+1, say there is event-rationality and mth-order
validated belief of event-rationality (RmvBER) at this state. If (sa, ta, sb, tb) ∈ ⋂∞m=1 Ram ×⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m say there is event-rationality and common validated belief of event-rationality
(RCvBER) at this state.
Because validated beliefs are stronger than standard beliefs, RCvBER ⊆ RCBER. Note
again that RCBER and RCvBER avoid the inclusion-exclusion tension. What a type ta of
Ann believes about Bob’s choices is given by the marginal of µa(ta) over Sb. Moreover, a
type that knows that Bob’s strategy-type pairs are in R
b
m is a type that assigns positive
probability only to the strategies that are consistent with R
b
m. Therefore, many of Bob’s
strategies can be excluded from ta’s consideration, without causing any contradiction in the
construction. The event-rational strategy-type pair (sa, ta) resorts to the tie-breaking list
`a(ta) to handle counter-factuals, without having to believe that the counter-factuals are a
real possibility.
4 Solution Concepts
Consider the following generalization of the definition in BFK of the support of a strategy
sa, which they denote su(sa).
Definition 8. Say that ra supports sa given Qb if there exists some σa ∈ ∆(Sa) with ra ∈
supp σa and pia(σa, sb) = pia(sa, sb) for all sb ∈ Qb. Write suQb(sa) for the set of ra ∈ Sa
that supports sa given Qb. Likewise for b.
Therefore, suSb(s
a) = su(sa). BFK characterize rationality and common assumption of
rationality (RCAR) by the solution concept of a self-admissible set (SAS).
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Definition 9. The set Qa ×Qb ⊆ Sa × Sb is an SAS if:
• each sa ∈ Qa is admissible with respect to Sa × Sb,
• each sa ∈ Qa is admissible with respect to Sa ×Qb,
• for any sa ∈ Qa, if ra ∈ suSb(sa), then ra ∈ Qa.
Likewise for b.
In particular, BFK show that the projection of the RCAR into Sa × Sb is an SAS.
Conversely, given an SAS Qa × Qb, there is a type structure such that the projection of
RCAR into Sa × Sb is equal to Qa ×Qb. BFK discuss the need for the third requirement in
the definition of an SAS. In particular, consider the weak best response sets (WBRS), which
does not include a restriction on convex combinations.
Definition 10. The set Qa ×Qb ⊆ Sa × Sb is a WBRS if:
• each sa ∈ Qa is admissible with respect to Sa × Sb,
• each sa ∈ Qa is not strongly dominated with respect to Sa ×Qb.
Likewise for b.
As Brandenburger (1992) and Bo¨rgers (1994) show, if common assumption of rationality
is relaxed to common belief at level 0 of rationality (RCB0R) (that is, believing E means
µ0(E) = 1, where µ0 is the first measure of the agent’s LPS), then the projection of RCB0R
into Sa× Sb is a WBRS. Conversely, given a WBRS Qa×Qb, there is a type structure such
that Qa × Qb is contained in (but not necessarily equal to) the projection of RCB0R into
Sa × Sb.12
Our main result is the characterization of RCBER and RCvBER in complete, compact
and continuous type structures, with two solution concepts, S∞W and IA, respectively.13
The first, S∞W , is the set of strategies that survive one round of deletion of inadmissible
strategies followed by iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies (Dekel and Fuden-
berg (1990)).
12See Section 11 in BFK.
13In Appendix C we also characterize RCBER and RCvBER in the case where the type spaces are not
complete but satisfy a richness condition.
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Definition 11. Let SW i1 = S
i
1, for i = a, b be the set admissible strategies and define
inductively, for m ≥ 1,
SW im+1 = {si ∈ SW im : si is not strongly dominated with respect to SW am × SW bm}.
Let S∞W =
⋂∞
m=1 SW
a
m ×
⋂∞
m=1 SW
a
m.
The second, IA, is the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies.
Definition 12. Set Si0 = S
i for i = a, b and define inductively, for m ≥ 0,
Sim+1 = {si ∈ Sim : si is admissible with respect to Sam × Sbm}.
A strategy si ∈ Sim is called m-admissible. A strategy si ∈
⋂∞
m=0 S
i
m is called iteratively
admissible (IA).
With a view to compare RCvBER with RCAR of BFK, we introduce the following gen-
eralization of the SAS.
Definition 13. The set Qa ×Qb ⊆ Sa × Sb is an SASPa×P b if:
• each sa ∈ Qa is admissible with respect to Sa × Sb,
• each sa ∈ Qa is admissible with respect to Sa ×Qb,
• for any sa ∈ Qa, if ra ∈ suP b(sa) and ra is admissible with respect to Sa × Sb, then
ra ∈ Qa.
Likewise for b.
Note that the only difference with an SAS is that the support suP b(s
a) is with respect
to an abstract set P b, not Sb. This means that the SAS is equivalent to the SASSa×Sb .14
Moreover, if Qa×Qb ⊆ P a×P b then an SASQa×Qb is also an SASPa×P b , but the reverse may
not hold. This means that for any P a × P b, an SASPa×P b is also an SAS.
14Note that if ra ∈ suSb(sa) and sa is admissible, then ra is also admissible. Hence, the third condition
for an SASSa×Sb is identical to the third condition for a SAS.
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5 Characterization of RCBER and RCvBER
Propositions 1 and 2 below show that, in a complete type structure and for big enough m,
RCmBER generates the S∞W set and RmvBER generates the IA set.
Proposition 1. Fix a complete structure 〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉. Then, for each m,
projSaR
a
m × projSbRbm = SW am × SW bm.
Proof. Let T a0 be the set of types t
a such that `a(ta) = {Sb}. From Lemma 3 we have that
(sa, ta) ∈ Ra1 implies sa is admissible. Conversely, since we have a complete structure, if sa is
admissible then there exists ta ∈ T a0 such that (sa, ta) ∈ Ra1. Hence, projSaRa1 = Sa1 = SW a1
and projSbR
b
1 = S
b
1 = SW
b
1 . Suppose that for up to m we have that projSaR
a
m = SW
a
m and
projSbR
b
m = SW
b
m. Suppose s
a ∈ SW am+1. Then, sa ∈ SW am = projSaRam. Because sa is
not strongly dominated with respect to SW am×SW bm, it is also not strongly dominated with
respect to Sa × SW bm. Hence, there is a v with supp v ⊆ SW bm under which sa is optimal.
We take (sa, ta), ta ∈ T a0 , with supp µa(ta) ⊆ Rbm and margSbµa(ta) = v. Because sa is
admissible with respect to Sb, (sa, ta) is event-rational. Because ta ∈ Ba(Rbm) and Rbm ⊆ Rbk,
1 ≤ k ≤ m, we have that (sa, ta) ∈ Ram+1 and sa ∈ projSaRam+1.
Suppose sa ∈ projSaRam+1. Then, sa ∈ SW am = projSaRam and supp margSbµa(ta) ⊆
SW bm = projSbR
b
m. Because s
a is optimal under v, where supp v ⊆ SW bm, sa is not strongly
dominated with respect to SW bm and therefore s
a ∈ SW am+1.
Proposition 2. Fix a complete type structure 〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉. Then, for each
m,
projSaR
a
m × projSbRbm = Sam × Sbm.
Proof. For m = 1, Lemma 3 and a complete structure imply projSaR
a
1 = S
a
1 . Suppose that
for up to m we have that projSaR
a
m = S
a
m and projSbR
b
m = S
b
m. Suppose s
a ∈ Sam+1. Then,
sa ∈ Sam = projSaRam. Because sa is admissible with respect to Sam×Sbm, it is also admissible
with respect to Sa×Sbm. Note that Sbm ⊆ . . . Sb1 ⊆ Sb and take ta such that margSbµa(ta) = v,
`a(ta) = {Sb, Sb1, . . . , Sbm}. Because sa is admissible with respect to Sa×Sbm, we can choose v
such that suppv = Sbm and s
a is best response to v. Therefore, suppµa(ta) = R
b
m. Take any
set Sbi ∈ `(ta) with Sbi \ Sbm 6= ∅ and mixed strategy σa such that σa ∼Sbm sa. Suppose there
exists no measure v′, with suppv′ = Sbi \ suppv, such that pia(sa, v′) ≥ pia(σa, v′). Then, σa
weakly dominates sa on Sbi , which implies that s
a is not admissible with respect to Sa × Sbi ,
a contradiction. Therefore, (sa, ta) is event-rational and ta ∈ Bav (Rbk) for all k ≤ m, which
implies that (sa, ta) ∈ Ram+1 and sa ∈ projSaRam+1.
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Suppose sa ∈ projSaRam+1. Then, sa ∈ Sam = projSaRam and there exists ta such that
(sa, ta) ∈ Ram+1 and supp margSbµa(ta) ⊆ Sbm = projSbRbm. Because ta ∈ Bav (Rbm), Sbm ∈
`a(ta). Hence, we have that sa is admissible with respect to Sam × Sbm and sa ∈ Sam+1.
5.1 Comparison with BFK
BFK’s LEU-based approach uses the following construction. Let L+(X) be the space of fully
supported lexicographic probability systems over X, that is, the space of finite sequences σ =
(µ0, . . . , µn−1), for some integer n, where µi ∈ ∆(X) and
⋃n−1
i=0 supp µi = X. In addition, the
probability measures µi in σ are required to be non-overlapping, that is, mutually singular. A
lexicographic type structure is a type structure where λa : T a → L+(Sb × T b), and similarly
for b. An event E is assumed by type ta of Ann if and only if there is a level j such that
λa(ta) assigns probability one to the event E for all levels k ≤ j, and assigns probability zero
to the event for all levels k > j. Yang (2009) uses a weaker notion that allows the levels
higher than j to assign positive (and strictly smaller than 1) weights to the event. The use
of lexicographic beliefs is to be contrasted with our use of standard beliefs.
RCAR in BFK is characterized by the SAS and RmAR (m levels of mutual assumption)
produces the IA set in a complete structure, for big enough m. Since RmvBER generates
the IA set as well, it is important to study the relationship between RCAR and RCvBER
in terms of the solution concepts they generate. The following Proposition and examples
show that RCvBER generates a strict subclass of SAS, hence it is a more restrictive notion
than RCAR. However, as we show in the following section, RCvBER and RCBER are always
nonempty in a complete, continuous and compact structure, unlike RCAR. Let Aa and Ab
be the set of Ann’s and Bob’s admissible strategies, respectively.
Proposition 3.
(i) Fix a type structure 〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉. Then projSa
⋂∞
m=1 R
a
m×projSb
⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m
is an SASAa×Ab.
(ii) Fix an SASQa×Qb Qa×Qb. Then there is a type structure 〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉
with Qa ×Qb = projSa
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m × projSb
⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m.
Proof. For part (i), if Qa × Qb = projSa
⋂∞
m=1 R
a
m × projSb
⋂∞
m=1R
b
m is empty, then the
conditions for SASAa×Ab are satisfied, so suppose that it is nonempty. By definition of event-
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rationality and Lemma 3, each sa ∈ Qa = projSa
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m is admissible with respect to
Sa × Sb and Sa ×Qb.
Suppose sa ∈ Qa, ra ∈ suAb(sa) and ra is admissible. This implies that for any ta,
(sa, ta) ∈ ⋂∞m=1 Ram implies that supp margSbµa(ta) ⊆ Ab and ra is optimal under v =
margSbµ
a(ta) (Lemma D.2 in BFK). Because ra is admissible we have that (ra, ta) ∈ Ra1.
For each m ≥ 2, (sa, ta) ∈ Ram implies that ta has a validated belief in Rbm−1. Because
projSbR
b
m−1 ⊆ Ab and ra ∈ suAb(sa), we have that (ra, ta) ∈ Ram and ra ∈ Qa.
For part (ii) fix an SASQa×Qb Qa×Qb and note that for each sa ∈ Qa which is admissible
with respect to Qb, there is a v with supp v = Qb under which sa is optimal. We can choose v
such that ra is optimal under v if and only if ra ∈ suQb(sa) (Lemma D.4 in BFK). Define type
spaces T a = Qa, T b = Qb, with λa and λb chosen so that supp µa(sa) = {(sb, sb) : sb ∈ Qb}
and supp µb(sb) = {(sa, sa) : sa ∈ Qa}; and `a(sa) = {Sb} and `b(sb) = {Sa} for all sa and
sb.
We first show that Qa = projSaR
a
1 and Q
b = projSbR
b
1. By construction, for each s
a ∈ Qa,
sa is optimal under v = margSbµ
a(sa) and admissible. Hence, (sa, sa) is event-rational and
Qa ⊆ projSaRa1. Suppose (ra, ta) ∈ Ra1, where ta = sa. Then, ra ∈ suQb(sa) and ra is
admissible with respect to both Sa × Qb and Sa × Sb. From the definition of an SASQa×Qb
this implies that ra ∈ Qa and Qa = projSaRa1. Applying similar arguments we have that
Qb = projSbR
b
1.
Moreover, each type ta ∈ Qa puts positive probability only to elements in the diagonal
(sb, sb), which consists of event-rational strategy-type pairs, hence ta has a validated belief
in R
b
1. Since all types only consider the list {Sb} as possible, we have that Ram = Ra1 and
R
b
m = R
b
1 for all m, by induction. Since projSaR
a
1 × projSbRb1 = Qa × Qb we also have
Qa ×Qb = projSa
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m × projSb
⋂∞
m=1R
b
m.
In words, for a given type structure, the strategies compatible with RCvBER form a sub-
class of all of the SAS, and there is a class of SAS (the Qa×Qb sets that are SASQa×Qb) whose
strategies are compatible with RCvBER for some type structure. Because an SASQa×Qb
Qa × Qb is an SASAa×Ab but the converse is not true, Proposition 3 does not provide a
characterization of RCvBER. It does show, however, that RCAR, which is characterized by
SAS (BFK, Proposition 8.1), is less restrictive than RCvBER.
In fact, the following game provides an example of an SAS that is not an SASAa×Ab and
cannot be generated by RCvBER for any type structure. Hence, RCvBER generates a strict
subclass of SAS.
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L C R
U 1, 1 2, 1 1, 1
M 2, 2 0, 1 1, 0
D 0, 1 4, 2 0, 0
Note that all strategies except for R are admissible and that {U} × {L,C} is an SAS
but not an SASAa×Ab . The reason is that D and M are in the support of a mixed strategy
(assigning weight 1/2 to each) that is equivalent to U given that Bob plays his admissible
strategies L and C, but not given the set of all strategies Sb. Since D and M are not included
in {U} × {L,C}, this is not an SASAa×Ab .
We now argue that {U} × {L,C} cannot be the outcome of RCvBER. First, note that if
this were the case, the types of Ann included in RCvBER should assign zero probability to
Bob playing R. Note also that U is a best response only when Pr(L) = 2
3
and Pr(C) = 1
3
and, for these conjectures, also M and D are best responses. Is it possible that M and D
are excluded because types playing these strategies are not {L,C}-rational or Sb-rational?
No, because M and D are admissible with respect to both {L,C} and Sb. Hence, under
RCvBER, for any type structure, whenever U is included, M and D are included as well.
In the following game all strategies are admissible, hence an SAS is equivalent to an
SASAa×Ab .
L C R
U 1, 1 2, 1 1, 1
M 2, 2 0, 1 1, 5
D 0, 1 4, 2 0, 0
The same arguments show that RCvBER cannot produce {U}×{L,C} which is both an
SAS and an SASAa×Ab but not an SASQa×Qb . Hence, we cannot have a tighter characteriza-
tion in terms of Proposition 3.
As a last comparison note that, from the proof of Proposition 2, a type of Ann that is
event-rational and has (m + 1)th order validated belief of event-rationality in a complete
type structure, necessarily has the sets Sb0, S
b
1, ..., S
b
m in the type’s tie-breaking list. This
gives the intuition behind how RCvBER generates the IA set. In comparison, in BFK a
type ta of Ann that is rational and satisfies (m + 1)th order assumption of rationality in a
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complete type structure, necessarily satisfies
∀k ≤ m,∃j,
⋃
i≤j
supp µi = S
b
k
where (µ0, ..., µn−1) is the list of marginals over Sb associated with type ta.
6 Possibility Results for RCBER and RCvBER
Since the games are assumed to be finite, Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that RmBER and
RmvBER generate the S∞W and IA sets, respectively, for m large enough. However, an
epistemic criterion for S∞W and IA has to be the same across all games and therefore
independent of m. Below, we show that RCBER and RCvBER are nonempty whenever the
type structure is complete, continuous and compact. Recall that the universal type structure
(Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Appendix B) satisfies these properties. Hence, we provide
an epistemic criterion for S∞W and IA.
Proposition 4. Fix a complete, continuous and compact type structure 〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉.
Then, RCBER and RCvBER are nonempty.
Proof. First, note that from Propositions 1 and 2, the sets Ram × Rbm and Ram × Rbm are
nonempty for each m ≥ 1.
We first show that Ra1 is closed. Note that T
a is compact. For any sequence (san, t
a
n)
in Ra1, we have s
a
n ∈ BR(van), where van = margSbµa(tan). If (san, tan) → (sa, ta), then van →
va = margSbµ
a(ta), implying that sa ∈ BR(va). Also, because Sa is finite, we have sa = san
for large n, so sa ∈ BRa(van). Further, because Sb is finite, we can choose a subsequence
with supp van = supp v
a
k for all indices n, k and a fortiori supp v
a ⊂ supp van. Let σa satisfy
σa ∼supp va sa. If supp va = supp van we have σa ∼supp van sa. Hence, for each Fi ∈ `a(ta),
there exists vi with support equal to Fi \ supp va, such that pia(sa, vi) ≥ pia(σa, vi). If
supp va 6= supp van, then because sa ∈ BRa(van) and σa ∼supp va sa , it must be that there
exists η ∈ ∆(Sb) with pia(sa, µ) ≥ pia(σa, η) and supp η = supp van \ supp va (η can be taken
as the conditional of van on supp v
a
n\supp va). Now put η′ = αη+(1−α)vi for some α ∈ (0, 1),
note that supp η′ = Fi \ supp va and that pia(sa, η′) ≥ pia(σa, η′). That is, (sa, ta) ∈ Ra1, so it
is a closed subset of the compact space Sa × T a.
Consider Ra2 = R
a
1 ∩ [Sa×Ba(Rb1)], and pick a convergent sequence (san, tan) therein, with
limit (sa, ta). Because Rb1 is closed and λ
a is continuous, we have lim suptan→ta µ
a(tan)(R
b
1) ≤
µa(ta)(Rb1). Hence µ
a(ta)(Rb1) = 1 because µ
a(tan)(R
b
1) = 1 for every n. Also, event-rationality
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follows from an argument similar to the argument above, and we conclude that Ra2 is compact.
Inductively, Ram is compact for all m. It follows that
⋂
m≥1R
a
m 6= ∅ because the family
{Ram}m≥1 has the finite intersection property: for any finite list {m1, . . . ,mK} of positive
numbers, let mk be the largest. Then we know that R
a
mk
6= ∅ and it is included in ⋂Kk=1Ramk .
We also have compactness of the sets R
a
m. Pick a sequence (s
a
n, t
a
n) in R
a
m converging to
(sa, ta), and without loss of generality focus on a subsequence with `a(tan) = `
a(tak) for all
n, k. It must then be that `a(tan) = `
a(ta). Repeat the argument in the first paragraph of the
proof to conclude that (sa, ta) is event-rational because (san, t
a
n) is event-rational for each n,
and projSbR
b
m−1 ∈ `a(ta), so (sa, ta) ∈ Ram. Hence we have a nested sequence of nonempty
compact spaces, so by the finite intersection property, we have
⋂
m≥1R
a
m 6= ∅.
The same arguments apply to b.
7 Conclusion
Let us summarize the contributions of the paper. (1) We define a new notion of rationality,
named event-rationality, and provide preference basis for it. The preferences of event-rational
players are represented by a pair (v, `), where v is a probability measure and ` is a set of
events, used for breaking ties. We require that the set of all strategies of the opponent is a
member of `, obtaining as a result that event-rational agents play admissible strategies. (2)
We define and provide decision theoretic foundations for a new notion of “believing”, named
validated belief, which relates to the preference representation of event-rationality. (3) We
provide epistemic conditions for two well-known solution concepts in game theory, S∞W
and IA. We do so by constructing the set of states where “rationality and common belief
of rationality” obtain, using event-rationality as the notion of rationality and (for the IA
case) validated belief as the notion of belief. The epistemic characterization of IA solves a
well-known and much-studied problem in a novel way without requiring the use of incomplete
or discontinuous type structures. (4) We show that RCvBER can be used to justify a strictly
smaller class of solutions than BFK’s RCAR, thus showing that RCvBER and RCAR are not
merely isomorphic conditions written in two different languages. (5) Finally, let us note that
Appendix C provides two new solution concepts, HAS and HIA, that characterize RCBER
and RCvBER respectively, when type spaces are not necessarily complete but satisfy an
alternative richness condition.
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A Preference Basis
We develop preference foundations for event-rationality and validated beliefs, using the idea
that a decision maker is represented by a list of preferences. Let Ω be a state space and
A the set of all measurable functions from Ω to [0, 1]. For simplicity, assume that Ω is
finite (abstracting from technical details, the considerations below carry through in a more
general state space). A decision maker has preferences over elements of A. We assume that
the outcome space [0, 1] is in utils. That is, all preferences considered below agree on constant
acts over an outcome space, so the Bernoulli indices are uniquely defined and omitted from
the analysis that follows. For x, y ∈ A, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, αx + (1− α)y is the act that at ω gives
payoff αx(ω) + (1−α)y(ω). Unless otherwise noted, we assume that a preference relation %
satisfies completeness, transitivity, independence and has an expected utility representation.
Definition 14. x %E y if for some z ∈ A, (xE, zΩ\E) % (yE, zΩ\E).
Note that for preferences satisfying the aforementioned axioms, (xE, zΩ\E) % (yE, zΩ\E)
holds for all z if it holds for some z. An event E is Savage null if x ∼E y for all x, y ∈ A.
For a given %, the set N(%) ⊂ Ω denotes the union of all non Savage null events according
to %.
Fix a game and the resulting set of available acts B. An act x ∈ B is event-rational
if there exist a preference % and a list ` = {F1, ..., Fk}, with F1 ( F2 ( · · · ( Fk = Ω such
that
• x % y for every y ∈ B,
• for each Fi ∈ ` with Fi \N(%) 6= ∅ and act y ∈ B with x(ω) = y(ω) for all ω ∈ N(%),
there exists a preference %′ with N(%′) = Fi \N(%) such that x %′ y.
Therefore, the definition of event-rationality is identical to that of the main text.
Consider a decision maker represented by a list of preferences {%i}ki=0 with N(%i) ∩
N (%0) = ∅ for i = 1, ..., k and N(%1) ( N(%2) ( · · · ( N(%k) = Ω \ N(%0).15 The
interpretation is that N(%0) is the theory of the decision maker, and the list {N(%i)}ki=1
represents the thought experiments used to break ties. Formally, given a list of preferences
{%i}ki=0 satisfying the aforementioned two properties we define an induced preference relation
over acts, %c, as follows:
15One can think of conditional preferences, as in Luce and Krantz (1971), Fishburn (1973) and Ghirardato
(2002).
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Definition 15. x %c y if and only if either
• x %0 y and x 6= y on N(%0) or
• x = y on N(%0) and x %i y for i = 1, ..., k.
An act x is %c-rational if x %c y for every y ∈ B.
Proposition 5. An act x is %c-rational if and only if it is event-rational.
Proof. By definition, if x is %c-rational, then it is event-rational under %=%0 and ` =
{F1, ..., Fk}, with Fi = N(%i) ∪N(%0) for i = 1, ..., k.
Conversely, let x be event-rational under %ˆ and ` = {F1, ..., Fk}. If x 6= y on N(%ˆ),
then x %c y using %0= %ˆ. So let us focus on acts in C = {y ∈ B : y = x on N(%ˆ)}. Let
m = #Ω\N(%ˆ), and note that the set C can be identified as a convex in [0, 1]m, with x ∈ C.
For each i = 1, ..., k where Ei = Fi \N(%ˆ) 6= ∅, let Bi = {r ∈ Rm+ : r|Ei  x|Ei}, where x|Ei
denotes the vector x restricted to states in Ei. Note that Bi ∩ C = ∅, because otherwise
there would exist an act y that is outcome-equivalent to x and strictly preferred to x for
any preference %′ with N(%′) = Ei, contradicting event-rationality of x. Because Bi is also
convex, by the separating hyperplane theorem there exists αi ∈ Rm with αi · r > αi · y for
all r ∈ Bi and y ∈ C. Take rε ∈ Rm+ with rε(ω) = x(ω) for ω /∈ Ei and rε(ω) = x(ω) + ε for
ω ∈ Ei and ε > 0. Then rε ∈ Bi. Letting ε→ 0, we have rε → x and we obtain αi ·x ≥ αi ·y
for every y ∈ C.
Also, αi can be chosen to satisfy αi(ω) > 0 only if ω ∈ Ei. Otherwise, say that αi(ω′) > 0
and ω′ /∈ Ei. If y(ω′) = 0 for every act in B, then αi(ω′) can be set equal to zero without
loss. If x(ω′) = 0 and there exists y ∈ C with y(ω′) > 0, then it cannot be the case that
Fi = {ω′} for any i = 1, ..., k. So set y(ω) = x(ω) for every ω 6= ω′ and y(ω′) > x(ω′), with
y ∈ C. Such a y exists because Ei 6= Ω \ N(%ˆ) (if it was equal, then ω′ would not exist)
and there is no Fi equal to {ω′}. Then αi · rε > αi · y, for the rε constructed above. But as
ε→ 0, rε → x and αi ·x < αi · y by construction. This contradicts αi · rε > αi · y for all ε. In
the case that x(ω′) > 0, change the rε above by having rε(ω′) = 0, while keeping the other
values. Then as ε → 0, we must get αi · rε < αi · x, another contradiction. So the support
of αi is contained in Ei.
Moreover, because for each y ∈ C there exists %′ with N(%′) = Ei and x %′ y, it must be
that α(ω) > 0 if ω ∈ Ei. If not, then there is ω′ ∈ Ei with αi(ω′) = 0, and there is no other
α′i with α
′
i(ω
′) > 0 that would separate Bi and C. Now take the original rε and y ∈ C with
y(ω′) > x(ω′). Such a y must exist, for otherwise there would exist the required α′i. But
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there is no %′ with N(%′) = Ei and x %′ y, a contradiction. So it must be that αi(ω) > 0 if
and only if ω ∈ Ei.
Normalizing αi yields a probability distribution νi with supp νi = Ei for which x is
a better response than any y ∈ C. Let %i be the preference relation represented by the
underlying Bernoulli index and νi. The construction above is true for every i = 1, ..., k.
Setting %0= %ˆ and collecting the list {%0,%1, ...,%k} it follows that x is %c-rational.
In what follows, for ease of notation, we use Ni = N(%i) for i = 0, ..., k, x iE y to
denote that x is preferred to y according to %i conditional on E (according to Definition
14), and x =0E y to denote that x(ω) = y(ω) for all ω ∈ N0 ∩ E 6= ∅. The notions of beliefs
we use in the main text are as follows.
Definition 16. Event E is believed under %c if N0 ⊂ E.
Definition 17. Event E has a validated belief under %c and i if E = N0 ∪Ni.
In words, the decision maker believes an event E if she believes it according to her theory.
She has a validated belief in it if it is equal to the union of N0 and some Ni. Note that it may
well be that i = 0, so the decision maker may have a validated belief in the event E = N0.
Note that in the text we “validated” a belief with events that describe strategies only. Here
we do not make this distinction for ease of exposition. It is straightforward to consider a
product state space Ω = Ω1 × Ω2 and define belief for events on Ω and validated beliefs as
those that are validated by the projection of an Ni to Ω1.
We now define a notion of conditional %c-preference that is consistent with tie-breaking
ideas.
Definition 18. Say that x cE y under i if
• x 0E y or
• x =0E y, x iE y and x %j y for every j 6= i.
Say that x cE y if x cE y for some i. Note that x cE y under i and x =0E y necessarily
mean that i > 0.
Definition 19. An event E is nontrivial under %c and i if
• there is a pair x, y with x cE y under i, and
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• if ω ∈ E is such that there is no pair x, y with x cω y, then there is a pair x, y with
x = y on N0 such that x cE(ω) y under i, where E(ω) = E ∩ (N0 ∪ {ω}).
Definition 20. An event E satisfies strict determination under %c and i if for all x, y,
x cE y under i implies x c y.
The following Lemma characterizes validated belief with respect to nontriviality and
strict determination.
Lemma 4. There exists i such that E has a validated belief under %c and i if and only if it
is nontrivial and satisfies strict determination under %c and i.
Proof. By nontriviality, E∩N0 6= ∅, for otherwise there would exist no pair x, y with x cE y.
Assume by way of contradiction that there exists ωˆ ∈ N0 \ E. Also, let ω′ ∈ E ∩ N0. Set
x(ω′) = 1 and zero otherwise, and set
y(ω) =

a if ω = ωˆ
b if ω = ω′
0 otherwise
where a > v0(ω
′)(1−b)
v0(ωˆ)
, 0 < b < 1, and v0 is the conjecture associated with %0. Then,
conditional on E, the payoff of x is equal to 1 whereas the payoff of y is b < 1, so x cE y;
but the unconditional payoff of x is equal to v0(ω
′) whereas the payoff of y is av0(ωˆ)+bv0(ω′),
so y c x, contradicting strict determination. Hence N0 ⊂ E. Therefore, if for all ω ∈ E
there exists a pair x, y with x cω y, then E ⊂ N0, and we conclude that E = N0 ∪Ni, with
i = 0.
If there is ω ∈ E for which there is no pair x, y with x cω y, then ω /∈ N0. By nontriviality,
there is a pair x, y with x = y on N0 with x cE(ω) y under i, meaning that x iE(ω) y, which
in turn means that ω ∈ Ni and i 6= 0. Hence we must have E ⊂ N0∪Ni. Similarly to above,
assume by way of contradiction that there exists ωˆ ∈ Ni\E. Also, let ω′ ∈ E∩Ni. Construct
x and y as follows: x = y on N0, and on Ω \ N0 x and y are as above, with a > vi(ω′)(1−b)vi(ωˆ) .
Strict determination is again violated, so we must have N0 ∪Ni ⊂ E, and we conclude that
E = N0 ∪Ni with i > 0.
Conversely, assume that E = N0 ∪ Ni for some i. Let x = 1 on N0, 0 otherwise and
y(ω) = 0 for every ω. Then x c0 y and x cE y under i. For the second condition, if i = 0,
then E = N0 and there does not exist ω ∈ E such that there is no pair x, y with x cω y.
If i 6= 0, pick ω ∈ Ni (so ω /∈ N0). Set x = y on N0, x(ω) = 1, y(ω) = 0 and x = y = 0
elsewhere. Then x cE(ω) y, so nontriviality is satisfied.
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Finally, let x cE y under i. If x 0E y then x 0 y, implying that x c y. If x =0E y,
x iE y and x %j y for every j 6= i, then x = y on N0, x i y and x %j y for every j 6= i,
which again means that x c y. So strict determination is satisfied.
Corollary 1. An event E is believed under %c if and only if it satisfies strict determination
under %c and i = 0 and there exists a pair x, y with x cE y under i = 0.
B Type Spaces
We show that the standard construction of all hierarchies of beliefs about beliefs generates a
complete and continuous type structure. Because the types consistent with event-rationality
are mapped to both probability measures and lists, we need to adapt the standard construc-
tion. One route is to follow Epstein and Wang (1995) and work with more general beliefs
about beliefs. Another route, followed bellow, is to construct an complete, continuous and
compact auxiliary type structure, using the standard construction, and then use it to derive
the desired type structure.
Let ∆∗(X × Li) be the space of all probability measures over X × Li (endowed with the
weak* topology) for which the marginal on Li is a mass point, for i = a, b.
Let Ωa1 = S
b × Lb and T a1 = ∆∗(Sb × Lb). Inductively, set Ωak+1 = Sb × Lb × T bk where
T ak+1 = {(µa1, ..., µak, µak+1) ∈ T ak ×∆∗(Ωak+1) : margΩakµ
a
k+1 = µ
a
k}.
Likewise for b. Then, the standard arguments in the literature show the existence of compact
spaces T a∗ and T
b
∗ , with T
a
∗ homeomorphic to ∆
∗(Sb × T b∗ × Lb) and T b∗ homeomorphic to
∆∗(Sa × T a∗ × La).16 In fact, let T a∗ be the projective limit of the spaces (T ak )∞k=1. T a∗ is
compact as it is a product of compact spaces. Construct T b∗ similarly. Then, Theorem 8 in
Heifetz (1993) shows that, for each tower (µak)
∞
k=1, there exists µ
a ∈ ∆(Sb × Lb × T b∗ ) with
margΩakµ
a = µak, for all k ≥ 1. In particular, the marginal of µa on Lb is a mass point, so
µa ∈ ∆∗(Sb×Lb×T b∗ ). Conversely, each µa ∈ ∆∗(Sb×Lb×T b∗ ) gives rise to a tower (µak)∞k=1,
given by the list of marginals. Hence, there is a bijection λa∗ : T
a
∗ → ∆∗(Sb × Lb × T b∗ ).
Theorem 9 in Heifetz (1993) ensures that λa∗ is a homeomorphism, likewise for b. Therefore,
we have constructed a complete, continuous and compact auxiliary type structure
〈Si, Li, T i∗, λi∗〉i∈{a,b}
16See for instance Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) and Heifetz (1993).
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with λi∗ : T
i
∗ → ∆∗(Sj × T j∗ × Lj) for j 6= i = a, b. Note that λi∗(ti∗) = µ(ti∗)⊗ δ`(ti∗) where δx
is the point mass at x.
Now set T i = T i∗ (carrying the same topology, so T
i is compact Hausdorff) and λi(ti∗) =
(µ(ti∗), `(t
i
∗)), for i = a, b. The assignment λ
i
∗ 7→ λi is a bijection and preserves continuity: λi
is continuous if and only if λi∗ is continuous. Indeed, let t
i
α → ti in T i. This is a converging
net in T i∗, so λ
i
∗(t
i
α)→ λi∗(ti), or µ(tiα)⊗ δ`(tiα) → µ(ti)⊗ δ`(ti). But δ`(tiα) → δ`(ti) in the weak*
topology if and only if `(tiα)→ `(ti). So (µ(tiα), `(tiα))→ (µ(ti), `(ti)), or λi(tiα)→ λi(ti), for
i = a, b. A similar argument establishes that λi∗ is continuous if λ
i is continuous. Moreover, λi
is injective and surjective. Hence, it is a homeomorphism, as a continuous bijection between
compact Hausdorff spaces. Therefore, the type structure
〈Si, Li, T i, λi〉i∈{a,b},
with λi : T i → ∆(Sj × T j) × Lj for j 6= i = a, b just constructed, is complete, continuous
and compact.
It is important to emphasize a conceptual point here. The two players form beliefs about
beliefs about what is relevant for rational choices. That is, Ann has beliefs over Sb×Lb, and
these beliefs are given by a conjecture over Sb and a list ` ∈ Lb (or, equivalently, a point
mass over Lb.) What is relevant for event-rational choices is precisely the conjecture and
the list. But Ann does not know what Bob’s beliefs are, and the hierarchies of beliefs about
beliefs constructed above yield a type structure as the one we use in the paper.
B.1 Lists over Types
We argued in the text that lists over strategies suffice for the analysis. Indeed, it is redundant
to include subsets of types in the tie-breaking lists, as types do not play any role in breaking
ties. Also, provided that we consider a rich list of subsets of types, such lists would not
interfere in the constructions in the text that used validated beliefs. Let us now show how to
obtain a type structure with rich lists over strategies and types from a given type structure.
Let the type structure 〈Si, Li, T i, λi〉i∈{a,b} be given. For i 6= j = a, b, let F(T i) denote the
space of all closed subsets of T i, endowed with the Fell topology.17 Say `i(ti) = {E1, ..., Ek},
with Er ⊂ Sj for r = 1, ..., k. Let Er = {sj1, ..., sjm} and construct Er = {({sj1}×K, ..., {sjm}×
K ′) : (K, ...,K ′) ∈ (F(T j))m}, for r = 1, ..., k, where (F(T j))m denotes the product of m
17See, for instance, Molchanov (2005) for definitions of topologies on spaces of subsets. The nice feature
of the Fell topology is that F(T i) is compact whenever T i is Hausdorff. When T i is compact metric, the
Fell topology coincides with the standard Hausdorff metric topology.
33
copies of F(T j). Note that Er is compact whenever T j is Hausdorff. Finally, put ˆ`i(ti) =
{E1, ..., Ek} as the extended list. Repeat the procedure for all ti and i = a, b, to construct
the type structure
〈Si, Lˆi, T i, λˆi〉i∈{a,b}
where λˆi = (µi, ˆ`i) and Lˆi is the space of extended lists (as the one constructed above) of
subsets of Si × T i.
Now, for any closed subset F ⊂ Sj × T j, we have
F ∈ ˆ`i(ti)⇔ projSjF ∈ `i(ti).
That is, extended lists do not interfere with statements about validated beliefs. Extended
lists do not interfere with breaking ties either. So the arguments in the text apply to the
corresponding type structure with extended lists with no change (other than notation).
C Other Solution Concepts
In this section we define two new solution concepts that characterize RCBER and RCvBER
in all type structures that satisfy a richness condition. The first is Hypo-Admissible Sets
(HAS) and we compare it with the solution concepts defined in the main body of the paper.
Definition 21. The set Qa ×Qb ⊆ Sa × Sb is an HAS if:
• each sa ∈ Qa is admissible with respect to Sa × Sb.
For each sa ∈ Qa there is nonempty Q0 ⊆ Qb such that
• sa is admissible with respect to Sa ×Q0,
• for any sa ∈ Qa, if ra ∈ suQ0(sa) and ra is admissible with respect to Sa × Sb then
ra ∈ Qa.
Likewise for b.
Note that the first two properties for a WBRS are equivalent to the first two properties
for an HAS and they are implied by the first two properties for an SAS. Hence, the SAS
and the HAS are always WBRS but the opposite does not hold. Moreover, an SAS is not
necessarily an HAS and an HAS is not necessarily an SAS.
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Note that the S∞W set is both an HAS and a WBRS (but not an SAS) and the IA set
is an SAS and a WBRS (but not an HAS). The following game from Section 2 illustrates
the various definitions:
L R
U 1, 0 1, 3
M 0, 2 2, 2
D 0, 4 1, 1
The IA set is {M}×{R}. It is an SAS but not an HAS, because although L ∈ su{M}(R)
and L is admissible, it does not belong to the IA set. Moreover, S∞W = {U,M} × {L,R}
is an HAS but not an SAS, because L is not admissible with respect to {U,M}. That is, in
a sense the SAS captures IA whereas the HAS captures S∞W .
The second solution concept is the Hypo-Iteratively Admissible (HIA) set.
Definition 22. A set Qa × Qb is a hypo-iteratively admissible (HIA) set if there exist se-
quences of sets {W ai }∞i=0, {W bi }∞i=0, with W a0 = Sa, W b0 = Sb, such that for each m ≥ 0,
• each sa ∈ W am+1 is admissible with respect to Sa ×W bm and belongs to W am,
• for any k, m, where k ≥ m, if sa ∈ W ak+1, ra ∈ suW bk (sa) ∩W am and ra is admissible
with respect to Sa ×W bm, then ra ∈ W am+1,
• there is k such that for all m ≥ k, W am = Qa.
Likewise for b.
The HIA sets resemble the IA set, with the only difference that one starts with a subset
of admissible strategies and always includes the strategies that are equivalent (in the sense
of suQ) to strategies that survive subsequent rounds. Moreover, the HIA can be thought
of as an analogue of the best response set (BRS).18 If we replace admissible with strongly
undominated in the definition of HIA then we get a BRS. Conversely, each BRS Qa × Qb
can be written as a modified HIA (just set W ai = Q
a and W bi = Q
b for all i ≥ 1).
18Recall that Qa × Qb is a BRS if each sa ∈ Qa is strongly undominated with respect to Sa × Qb and
likewise for b.
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C.1 Characterizations
Proposition 6 below shows that RCBER is characterized by the HAS set in a rich type
structure. We say that a type structure is rich if, for each type ta with `a(ta) = (Eb1, ..., E
b
n)
and any list `′ such that Sb ∈ `′ ⊆ `a(ta), there exists a type ta0 with `a(ta0) = `′, and µa(ta) =
µa(ta0). Similarly for b. Recall our notation: RCBER is given by
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m ×
⋂∞
m=1R
b
m.
Proposition 6. (i) Fix a rich type structure 〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉. Then projSa
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m×
projSb
⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m is an HAS.
(ii) Fix an HAS Qa×Qb. Then there is a rich type structure 〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉
with Qa ×Qb = projSa
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m × projSb
⋂∞
m=1R
b
m.
Proof. Throughout we keep the convention that for any two sets, E and F , E × F = ∅
implies E = ∅ and F = ∅. For part (i), if Qa × Qb = projSa
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m × projSb
⋂∞
m=1R
b
m
is empty, then the conditions for HAS are satisfied, so suppose that it is nonempty and fix
sa ∈ Qa = projSa
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m. Then, for some t
a, (sa, ta) is consistent with RCBER and sa
is admissible, by Lemma 3. Since ta believes each Rbm, for all m, it also believes
⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m.
From the conjunction and marginalization properties of belief there is v = margSbµ
a(ta),
with support contained in projSb
⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m, such that s
a is optimal under v.
Let Q0 = supp v. We have that s
a is admissible with respect to Q0 = supp v, which is
a subset of Qb = projSb
⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m. Suppose s
a ∈ Qa, ra ∈ susupp v(sa) and ra is admissible.
From Lemma D.2 in BFK, ra is optimal under v whenever (sa, ta) ∈ Ra1.19 Because the
type structure is rich, there exists type ta0 with µ
a(ta0) = µ
a(ta) and `a(ta0) = S
b. Since ra is
admissible, we have that (ra, ta0) ∈ Ra1. The same is true for all Ram, hence the third property
for an HAS is satisfied.
For part (ii) fix an HAS Qa × Qb and note that for each sa ∈ Qa which is admissible
with respect to Qsa ⊆ Qb, there is a v with supp v = Qsa under which sa is optimal.
We can choose v such that ra is optimal under v if and only if ra ∈ suQsa (sa) (Lemma
D.4 in BFK).20 Define type spaces T a = Qa, T b = Qb, with λa and λb chosen so that
supp µa(sa) = {(sb, sb) : sb ∈ Qsa}, `a(sa) = {Sb} and v = margSbµa(sa) for the v found
above. Similarly for b. Note that the type structure is rich.
19Lemma D.2 specifies that if F is a face of a polytope P and x ∈ F , then su(x) ⊆ F , where su(x) is the
set of points that support x. The geometry of polytopes is presented in Appendix D in BFK.
20Lemma D.4 specifies that if x belongs to a strictly positive face of a polytope P , then su(x) is a strictly
positive face of P .
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First, we show that for each sa ∈ Qa, (sa, sa) is event-rational. By construction, sa
is optimal under v = margSbµ
a(sa) and admissible. Hence, (sa, sa) is event-rational and
Qa ⊆ projSaRa1. Suppose (ra, ta) ∈ Ra1, where ta = sa. Then, ra ∈ suQsa (sa) and ra is
admissible with respect to Qsa . From Lemma 3, r
a is admissible. From the definition of an
HAS this implies that ra ∈ Qa and Qa = projSaRa1. Applying similar arguments we have
that Qb = projSbR
b
1.
By construction, each ta ∈ Qa puts positive probability only to elements in the diagonal
(sb, sb) which consists of event-rational strategy-type pairs, hence ta believes Rb1 and (s
a, sa) ∈
Ra2. This implies that R
a
2 = R
a
1 and likewise for b. Thus, R
a
m = R
a
1 and R
b
m = R
b
1 for all m, by
induction. Since projSaR
a
1 × projSbRb1 = Qa×Qb we also have Qa×Qb = projSa
⋂∞
m=1 R
a
m×
projSb
⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m.
Proposition 7 shows that RCvBER is characterized by the HIA set in a rich type structure.
Recall our notation: RCvBER is given by
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m ×
⋂∞
m=1R
b
m.
Proposition 7.
(i) Fix a rich type structure 〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉. Then projSa
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m×projSb
⋂∞
m=1R
b
m
is an HIA set.
(ii) Fix an HIA set Qa×Qb. Then there is a rich type structure 〈Sa, Sb, La, Lb, T a, T b, λa, λb〉
with Qa ×Qb = projSa
⋂∞
m=1R
a
m × projSb
⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m.
Proof. For part (i), if Qa × Qb = projSa
⋂∞
m=1 R
a
m × projSb
⋂∞
m=1R
b
m is empty, then the
conditions for an HIA set are satisfied, so suppose that it is nonempty.
Set W am = projSaR
a
m for m ≥ 1 and likewise for b. From Lemma 3, all strategies
in projSbR
a
m+1 are admissible with respect to S
a × W bm and, by construction, belong to
projSbR
a
m.
Suppose that for some k, m, where k ≥ m, we have that sa ∈ W ak+1 = projSbR
a
k+1,
ra ∈ suW bk (sa) ∩W am and ra is admissible with respect to Sa ×W bm. This implies that for
some ta, (sa, ta) ∈ Rak+1, where supp margSbµa(ta) ⊆ W bk and list `a(ta) contains at least all
sets W bp , for p ≤ m. Because the type structure is rich, there exists type ta0, with `a(ta0) that
contains all sets W bp , for p ≤ m, and nothing else. Moreover, ta0 is identical to ta in all other
respects. Since ra ∈ suW bk (sa), ra is optimal given margSbµa(ta0). Moreover, ra is admissible
with respect to Sa ×W bp , for p ≤ m.
All these imply that (ra, ta0) ∈ Ram+1. The third condition is satisfied because projSa
⋂∞
m=1 R
a
m×
projSb
⋂∞
m=1 R
b
m is nonempty and the strategies are finite.
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For part (ii), fix an HIA set Qa×Qb, with sequences of sets {W am}m=n′m=0 , {W bm}m=nm=0 , where
W an′ = Q
a and W bn = Q
b. Construct the following type structure. For each m ≥ 1, for each
sa ∈ W am, find the measure v(sa,m) with support on W bm−1 such that ra is a best response
to v(sa,m) if and only if ra ∈ suW bm−1(sa). This is possible because of Lemma D.4 in BFK.
Type ta(sa,m) has a marginal v(sa,m) on Sb, the list `a(ta(sa,m)) = {W b0 , . . . ,W bm−1} on Lb
(omitting W bm−j if it is equal to W
b
m−j−1) and assigns positive probability only to strategy-
types (sb, tb(sb,m− 1)), for sb ∈ W bm−1. Finally, assign to each sa ∈ Sa type ta(ra, 0) which
is equal to ta(ra, k), for some ra ∈ W ak , k > 0. Similarly for b.
We now show that RCvBER generates the HIA set. For m = 1, we show that projSaR
a
1 =
W a1 . Suppose that s
a ∈ W a1 . Because sa is admissible and a best response to v(sa, 1), we have
(sa, ta(sa, 1)) ∈ Ra1 and sa ∈ projSaRa1. Suppose ra ∈ projSaRa1. Then, ra is a best response
to some measure v(sa, k + 1), k ≥ 0, for sa ∈ W ak+1 and ra ∈ suW bk (sa) ∩ W a0 . Because
(ra, ta(sa, k + 1)) is event-rational, ra is admissible. Therefore, by the second property for
an HIA set, ra ∈ W a1 . Moreover, by construction, for each sa ∈ W a1 , (sa, ta(sa, 1)) ∈ Ra1, and
similarly for b.
Assume that for up to m, projSaR
a
m = W
a
m and for each s
a ∈ W am, (sa, ta(sa,m)) ∈
R
a
m. Similarly for b. Suppose that s
a ∈ W am+1. By construction, sa is a best response to
v(sa,m + 1), which has a support of W bm = projSbR
b
m, and it is admissible with respect
to Sa ×W bm. Moreover, `a(ta(sa,m + 1)) = {W b0 , . . . ,W bm} and type ta(sa,m + 1) assigns
positive probability only to types (sb, tb(sb,m)) ∈ Rbm, for sb ∈ W bm. This implies that
(sa, ta(sa,m+1)) ∈ Ram+1 and sa ∈ projSaRam+1. Suppose ra ∈ projSaRam+1. By construction,
the only measures that have support which is a subset of W bm are measures that are associated
with strategies sa that belong to W ak+1, where k + 1 > m. Hence, (r
a, ta(sa, k + 1)) ∈ Ram+1
and ra is a best response to some measure v(sa, k + 1). By construction, ra ∈ suW bk (sa).
Moreover, ra is admissible with respect to Sa ×W bm. Hence, by the second property for an
HIA set we have that ra ∈ W am+1.
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